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From Security Sector Reform to Endemic Corruption: The Case
of Afghanistan
Abstract
Corruption and insecurity are reinforcing each other. It can hinder the democratic
processes and jeopardize the security sector through creating corrupt administrative
systems, manipulation of contracts and procurement. After the decomposition of the
Taliban in 2001, the U.S.-led coalition carried out Security Sector Reform (SSR) to (re)
construct the Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan National Army (ANA) together
known as Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). Over critical literature,
there are serious critiques concerning the U.S. and its allies’ scrimmage for their role in
conducting the SSR in Afghanistan.
The research argues that the lack of a long-term strategic vision for conducting SSR as part
of the state-building process by the international community was a critical challenge. This
crux has further been exacerbated by the privatization of SSR and the contrast between the
U.S. and its European allies on the role of the police. This dichotomy affected the anticorruption and law enforcement potentials of police, which resulted in the present crisis.
Additionally, this research figures out that insufficient oversight of contracts and
procurement, training and advising processes of the ANDSF gave more room for
misappropriation, theft, and fraud by both the local and international contractors. Finally,
all these shortfalls together with constant turnover have undermined the
counterinsurgency efforts of Afghan forces on the ground. Therefore, endless military
operation without any tangible results has wearied the people, and further added fodder to
the terrorist propaganda machine.
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Introduction
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center in New
York, a military operation (Operation Enduring Freedom in U.S. military
parlance) of predominantly Western countries led by the United States of
America invaded Afghanistan.1 The military carried out the operation
when the Taliban denied the United States’ demands for delivering Osama
bin Laden “the mastermind of the 2001 attacks” to the United States’
authorities.2 Osama was under the protection of the Taliban Regime at the
time.
Following the collapse of the Taliban Islamic Emirate, the United States
started its state building package based upon the “liberal peacebuilding”
paradigm.3 Building productive and effective government institutions,
bringing Security Sector Reforms (SSR), which included building the
Afghan National Army (ANA) to maintain security and the Afghan
National Police (ANP) to provide law and order, was at the heart of the
involvement in Afghanistan.4 After nearly seventeen years since then, all
the public institutions, particularly, the security sector is grappling with
tremendous challenges such as omnipresent corruption.
This research will review the literature produced on the international
coalition efforts, strategic fallacies, and challenges in building the Afghan
National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). Additionally, this will
delve into how international engagement with the money influx gave birth
to corruption in the security sector, which has resulted in the current
ANDSF crisis. In other words, this research tends to examine the following
key questions:
•

•

How has the United States-led international involvement in
Afghanistan enabled corruption to flourish in the security sector in
the country?
How has corruption undermined counterinsurgency in
Afghanistan?

The United States Scrimmage for Building ANDSF
Going through the literature on international involvement in Afghanistan,
raises many questions about their policies for building the ANDSF: Did the
international community have a realistic understanding of the size and the
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scope of forces needed for Afghanistan? If so, how has this policy been
consistent, and supported by adequate resources? While there are many
obstacles to reform the security sector in the Afghan context itself, much of
the literature, in this part, takes critical positions on the role of
international coalitions in building effective ANDSF—one that could
provide security, law, and order, and run counterinsurgency campaign in
the long term.
Many observers draw criticism that, initially, the international community
did not have a long-term and well-structured strategy for building the
Afghan National Army. Instead, it had always been hesitating whether or
not to establish such forces, and the absence of such a strategy resulted in
the present crisis of the ANSF. The U.S. Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) describes this as such: “The United
States and international coalitions were ill-prepared to conduct Security
Sector Reform (SSA) programs of the size and the scope required in
Afghanistan.”5 What Ahmed Rashid has written in his book, equally
demonstrates the absence of such programs and long-term policy in
Afghanistan:

The Pentagon had been stuck with the task of building a new
Afghan army, but it seemed extremely reluctant to get on
with the job. Rumsfeld was certainly not been on the idea.
He expected General Fahim to create an army, so why should
the United States bother to invest in a new one. Fahim
continued to be feted by the Pentagon, while the CIA
continued to pay lavish salaries to warlords and their
militias. There was little incentive from either side to change
this cozy relationship and build a professional Afghan army.6
Despite the United States disinclinations, in February 2002, the Pentagon
started training a brigade-sized infantry unit of eight hundred Afghan
soldiers with around six hundred additional men trained separately by
ISAF, which constituted the preliminary building of Afghan security forces
structure.7 Following to that, in June 2002, at a conference in Geneva on
security-sector reform, the international community agreed on a
framework to build an army of sixty thousand men, and ANP, a force of
sixty-two thousand men for which the United States and Germany
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committed to training them respectively.8 To train the ANA, the United
States assigned the Special Forces; however, later recognized that this task
was beyond the Special Forces’ capacity, and the U.S. Army’s 10th
Mountain Division took the responsibility. Subsequently, with the invasion
of Iraq, the Army National Guard assumed the training responsibility.
Consequently, according to SIGAR, despite lacking preparation, a welldefined doctrine, and strategy, the United States took the lead for training
the ANA.9
In 2002, Germany had been delegated the responsibility of training the
ANP, but it did not provide sufficient facilities and resources. Building a
police academy in Kabul in 2002, Germany sent only 41 trainers to train
3500 new Afghan police officers over three years.10 Moreover, Ahmed
Rashid argues, “there was no plan for the countrywide training of 62,000
policemen and almost no equipment handed out to police stations, which
lacked radios, vehicles, and even weapons.”11
In 2003, when the United States decided to undertake this responsibility,
the training process continued with delays. Since the United States does
not have any particular state-owned structure for training police forces,
the State Department subcontracted this to DynCorp International,12 a
private company that recruited retired American police officers with no
knowledge about Afghanistan.13
Training a professional, effective, and efficient police is different and time
consuming from that of the army. However, the United States’ decision for
assigning a private military entity to train the Afghan police forces “has
further blurred the distinction between military and police.”14 The United
States trained the ANP to fight insurgency rather than win the hearts and
minds of the communities or represent an effective law enforcement
body.15 Between 2003 and 2005, the United States appropriated $860
million dollars for training forty thousand ANP, yet it yielded a poor
result.16 When DynCorp took the task to train the ANP in 2003, the
corporation scheduled three-week training courses “which were too short
with no follow-up or monitoring” to ensure effectiveness and standards.17
“The U.S. training program (for the police) under DynCorp is an appalling
joke, a complete shambles,” said Richard Holbrooke.18
Besides, the former U.S. ambassador further argued that the American
financial efforts to train the ANP have resulted in a force characterized by
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corruption and incompetence.19 At the same time, there are serious
criticisms on the United States for using its private companies and
contractors in the SSR of foreign security forces– the private security
companies, which design short tactical training programs that proved
largely ineffective outcomes with little oversight.20
According to the United Nations (UN), building and training of police due
to its direct engagement with law enforcement, security, and the capacity
to build up trust between the government and the people in a failed state
proved to be more difficult than that of the army. However, the centrality
of law enforcement and justice sector reforms were absent in the
international community agenda for several years to come to help stabilize
Afghanistan.21 Tonita Murray22 brings a similar argument about the
significant role of police in security and peacebuilding, but it is the weakest
of security forces in Afghanistan.23
Meanwhile, the system of developing and training a well-functioning
Afghan military had suffered from serious flaws as well. For example, lack
of continuity and rapid rotation of the international trainers have
undermined their training processes to build a well-functioning Afghan
military.24 SIGAR’s First Lesson Learned Report uncovers similar fallacy.
“The constant turnover of U.S. and NATO trainers impaired the training
mission’s institutional memory and hindered the relationship building
required in SSA missions.”25 The precipitous and constant replacement
trend did not only cover the trainers but it also took place at the leadership
level. In 2010, for instance, when Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the
commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan at the time, was relieved soon
after the Rolling Stone Magazine published his bitter remark about the
White House and replaced with Gen. David Petraeus, as the newly
appointed figure for the mission.26 Following that, the replacement had
been (creatively) justified as “a change in personnel, not a change in
policy” by the Obama Administration.27
Moreover, like the ANP, lack of equipment and resources for the ANA had
remained a major concern, which threatens their combat operations. In
2006, according to SIGAR findings, the ANA was “miserably underresourced” and such conditions were becoming a “major morale factor for
the force,” General Barry Concluded.28 Three years earlier in 2003,
following the intensification of terrorist attacks on different Afghan and
international targets, the Afghan security forces were suffering from the
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lack of resources on the battleground. Many observers had characterized
this as a possible failure and further asked for broader engagement in
supporting the Afghan forces in countering the insurgency. Brahimi
warned the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in December that
“the international community must decide whether to increase its level of
involvement in Afghanistan or risk failure.”29 Anthony H. Cordesman has
equally cited in his article that “the United States failed to seriously fund
and staff the training of the Afghan security forces until 2009, and police
were so poorly paid, and police officials had so much authority, that police
corruption became a nightmare for many ordinary Afghans.”30
Lack of facilities had not only undermined the counterinsurgency
capability of the Afghan forces but also did lead to unnecessary casualties
of these forces in the battleground. According to an interviewee, the case
of badly paid and supplied soldiers who cannot defend themselves against
the Taliban is a case in point as it happened in Kunduz and Ghazni
provinces. Many brave but undersupplied soldiers (likely most coming
from poor families) died which is a sort of war crime by itself.31
Furthermore, the ANDSF understaffed its training missions over the years.
SIGAR has covered some of these staffing shortfalls in its First Lesson
Learned Report. The report contends that one year later after the
establishment of NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) in 2009,
as a partner body to Combined Security Transition-Afghanistan (CSTC-A),
in February 2010, “when NTM-A/ CSTC-A became fully operational, only
1,810 of the required 4,083 trainers were in place, and similar shortages
remained as time went on.”32 Accordingly, lack of human and technical
resources has negatively affected the ANDSF development and their
performance in the counterinsurgency campaign. General John Craddock
describes NATO and its involvement in Afghanistan as such:
The crux of NATO's operational problems is that its
ambition outstrips its political will to resource that
ambition. Afghanistan is the textbook illustration. Since
mission inception, NATO nations have never completely
filled the agreed requirements for forces needed in
Afghanistan. 33
The lack of a long-term vision, consistent policy, and cracks in
international strategy for building the ANDSF have always been a
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serious issue, which has undergone several time-to-time changes. In
2006, for instance, at the NATO summit in Riga, the NATO SecretaryGeneral Jaap de Hoop Scheffer set the year 2008 as a deadline for the
ANA to take the security responsibility. When insecurity increase, the
U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates started criticizing the NATO
countries for not sending more soldiers. Gates said, “Our progress in
Afghanistan is real but it is fragile.” 34 Similarly, in March 2009, the
Obama Administration announced a new Comprehensive Strategy,
which was moving from Surge (sending additional thirty thousand
forces) to Transition (security responsibility handover) all the way to
Drawdown phase (foreign troop’s withdrawal) by 2014 from
Afghanistan. 35 However, when President Donald Trump took the
power, there was a shift in U.S. foreign policy. Unlike his predecessor,
Trump’s approach involved sending 4,000 additional U.S. troops to
Afghanistan plus reorienting the definition of success from the
timetable to a condition-based approach. 36 Meanwhile, Donald
Rumsfeld, the former U.S. Secretary of Defense, has also highlighted
the crux and lack of congruency in the international mission in
Afghanistan. According to Rumsfeld, “the mission no longer
determines the coalition in Afghanistan, instead, the many coalition
members determine the mission” that resulted in incoherence and
contradiction. 37 As a consequence, incoherent and lack of a jointly
long-term policy for building the ANDSF has compromised the capacity
of the forces to function properly on the ground.

Enabling Corruption in ANDSF: Shortsighted Policy or
Intended-Policy
The development of the ANDSF has been the bedrock of the international
community policy, in particular, that of the United States in Afghanistan.
From 2002 through 2017, the United States has devoted over $ 70 billion
(60 percent) its reconstruction funds to building the ANDSF.38 Despite
that, however, the Afghan’s defense security institutions remained at the
high risk of corruption and that this has severely affected their
engagement in counterinsurgency.39 In addition, this has led to serious
questions and uncertainties about the role of the international coalition in
building the ANDSF: What went wrong? How could powerbrokers become
overnight-milliners, through their own recalcitrance or external support?
Did the international community fight corruption or enabled corruption?
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If so, was it a shortsighted policy or intended policy?
Much of the literature takes critical positions toward the international
coalition’s role in fighting corruption, particularly, in the security sector.
Sarah Chayes, for instance, argues, “the international community has
enabled and encouraged corruption through agreement and silence, and
often the active partnership.”40 In its most concerning form, Sarah further
describes this scenario as such:
Some countries in the international coalition had a historic
relationship with criminal powerbrokers that they were
reluctant to break. Most problematically, officials whose
abusive behavior poisoned relations with the population
were the favored “assets” of some Western intelligence
agencies.41
It may come with no surprise that in some cases, the C.I.A. has paid money
“wrapped package of bills” directly to some of the powerbrokers in the last
seventeen years in Afghanistan.42 Matthew Rosenberg uncovers a similar
story that how the C.I.A. flowed American dollars to the men of their
choice in Kabul. According to Rosenberg, tens of millions of dollars have
flowed from C.I.A. to the office of President Hamid Karzai in the last
several years to get influence the C.I.A. was seeking.43 As a result, the cash
has “fueled corruption and empowered warlords.”44
Although corruption dates back to 2001 in Afghanistan, the United States
has made it worse than ever.45 Since 2001, the international community
led by the United States has been dealing with what Sarah calls
counterproductive men – the term implicitly denotes corrupt officials in
Afghanistan.46 SIGAR has equally noted, “The United States contributed to
the growth of corruption by injecting tens of billions of dollars into the
Afghan economy, using flawed oversight and contracting practices, and
partnering with malign powerbrokers.”47 While in 2010, the United States
created the Combined Joint Interagency Task Force known as Shafafiyat
to work with the Major Crimes Task Force of Afghanistan to understand
the corrupt network. Due to the lack of sustained Afghan and United
States political commitment, it did not work well.48 According to Stephen
M. Walt, “we could not get Karzai to reform because he was the only game
in town.”49 This simply means that the international coalition has accepted
such a notorious partnership. Sarah Chayes believes that working with
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corrupt officials in Afghanistan means that writing them a blank check.50
Additionally, lack of an evaluation and monitoring body to provide an
independent and objective assessment of international activities and their
financial spending has always been another serious concern long after
their involvement in Afghanistan, which has led to growing questions
about accountability and transparency of foreign aid in the country. For
example, it was on July 2, 2012, when the United States selected John F.
Sopko as SIGAR to conduct an audit, inspection, and investigation to
detect and deter abuse of taxpayer dollars.51 Prior to this, there was not
any formal entity to monitor the implementation of projects in
Afghanistan systematically and exclusively. As David Francis states, the
American presence in Afghanistan since 2001 “helped grow corruption by
injecting tens of billions of dollars into the local economy with poor
oversight and broken contracting practices.”52 Therefore, as many
observers have asserted, corruption in Afghanistan, by at least 2009, had
become systemic, pervasive and entrenched affecting the courts, the army
and police, banking, and other key sectors.53
After SIGAR was established, the issue of lack of monitoring and oversight
of international aid mainly in the security sector has continued to remain a
challenge. Nevertheless, despite SIGAR’s investigative reports, there have
been two key challenges and limitations:
1. SIGAR’s investigations are confined mostly, if not all, to the U.S.
taxpayers and funded projects, and does not cover other NATO
partners’ backed projects;
2. SIGAR has always provided post-corruption scandal investigative
reports, rather than a timely and follow-up oversight of the
development projects in Afghanistan.
For example, the international partners made a donation of approximately
$3.17 billion since 2002 to cover the salaries and pensions of employees in
the MoI. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) took the
charge of oversight of this project known as Law and Order Trust Fund for
Afghanistan (LOTFA). However, SIGAR released its investigative report
concerning over $200 million the authorities had stolen and
misappropriated n the MoI in 2014.54 Therefore, the report released by
SIGAR was late, which did not provide preventive measures in tackling
corruption.
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Since most of the foreign aid goes to the security sector in Afghanistan;
therefore, one can infer that this body is more involved in corruption
scandals. For example, the United States allocated over $70 billion (60
percent) of its reconstruction aid to building the ANDSF through 2016 and
committed to paying over $4 billion annually to that effort.55 A large
percent of this donation has been embezzled which well be covered later in
this research.
Thus, over much of the literature, it demonstrates that limited oversight
has seriously resulted in foreign financial forfeitures. After 2005, the
international coalition commenced specialized police programs including
the Afghan Local Police. However, “with limited oversight from and
accountability to the Afghanistan government and the United States, these
police forces were reported to have engaged in corrupt activities,
ultimately serving as a net detractor from security.”56 According to
Lieutenant General Todd Semonite, former commanding general of CSTCA, the United States had no conditions on funds flowing through CSTC-A
to the Afghan defense and interior ministries before 2014.57 In May 2017,
at the Third Annual European Union Anti-Corruption Conference,
President Ashraf Ghani obviously acknowledged “the Ministry of Interior
is the heart of corruption in the security sector.”58
Given the fact, acute corruption within the security forces and the
associated ministries has catastrophically marred the ANDSF’s functions
on the battleground. SIGAR describes that corruption is officially a serious
threat to the U.S. missions in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, despite
consistent reports of entrenched and rampant corruption in the security
sector, the U.S. allocated its financial resources with little oversight.59 The
United States former ambassador to Kabul, Ryan Crocker, had expressed
his concerns about systemic corruption as a grave threat to international
success in Afghanistan. According to Crocker, “the ultimate point of failure
for our efforts was not an insurgency. It was the weight of endemic
corruption.”60
Meanwhile, from an anti-corruption standpoint, one main source of
insecurity in Afghanistan includes corruption in the ANDFS that ranges
from lack of merit-based system in recruitment and promotion, political
influence, lack of transparency in contracts and procurement of security
sector to ghost police officers.61 According to the chief of police in
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Helmand province, for instance, out of ten thousand police officers, only
five thousand are available in this province, which has undermined the
legitimacy of the state.62 This is perhaps one in several cases of as such. In
the most scandalous report, Integrity Watch Afghanistan has found that
“the actual number of police and soldiers might be around 120,000 while
official figures state there are around 322,638 assigned personnel.”63
Moreover, the dilemma of ghost police and soldiers does not only include
their physical absence on the ground, but it does also embrace their
payments on the ghost payroll that has brought about serious insecurity
and financial losses. For example, around $200 million of $3.17 billion
which had been donated by the UN, between 2002 to 2014, had been
misappropriated from the ANP salaries by the Afghan Ministry of Interior
when the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), the
program to fund the ANP with their payments and pensions under the
poor oversight of UNDP.64 While SIGAR requested basic information from
UNDP based in Kabul about this corruption scandal, the response shows
that 121 out of 300 ANP officers got paid through LOTFA funds, were
listed as on-stand-by. However, such personnel had not been available in
the Afghan Tashkil, which serves as the basis for the ANP salary
payments.65 Furthermore, SIGAR describes the theft and rampant
corruption of MoI as such:
From December 21, 2012, to December 20, 2013, the
Ministry of Interior (MoI) of Afghanistan could not account
for 17.4 million in pension withholdings and $9.9 million in
cooperative fund withholdings. The audit continues to
identify 4,579 improper ANSF payroll payments made
during the same period by the MoI totaling approximately
$40 million.66
Meanwhile, SIGAR has expressed its little confidence for UNDP’s lack of
interest in taking meaningful steps to address the issue of dubious
deductions and corruption from the ANP salaries and payments to ghost
personnel and officers.67 Therefore, in the face of such shortfalls, it can
seriously put the integrity of LOTFA and UNDP into question as well.
Likewise, over the literature and reports, there are horrible cases of
rampant corruption in contracts and procurement of the Ministry of
Defense (MoD) of Afghanistan, which has produced big financial and

https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol13/iss3/5
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.13.3.1755

108

Yasa: From Security Sector Reform to Endemic Corruption: The Case of Af

security implications. According to SIGAR, the security sector “has been
plagued by corruption, fraud, and accountability issues. Fuel theft has
become a lucrative business in Afghanistan. Corruption throughout the
Afghan fuel industry may even benefit the Taliban and other insurgent or
terrorist organizations by supplying funds and fuel to those
organizations.”68
The MoD of Afghanistan has become a corrupt syndicate while the United
States-led Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan was and
continues to be responsible for supplying fuel to the ANDSF, using a
portion of the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) annually. In doing so,
CSTC-A has used two different methods of funding fuel to the ANDSF over
the past several years:
1. Funding DOD-administered contracts of the United States, also
known as off-budget assistance, and
2. Paying ASFF funds directly to the Afghan government to pay for its
own contracts also referred to as on-budget assistance.69
In both mechanisms, CSTC-A is responsible to review all related
documents and ask for regular based reports. In 2014, CSTC-A moved fuel
procurement fully to on budget; however, in December 2016, it moved the
fuel procurement back to off-budget for the MoI and in February 2017 for
the MoD. The change took place because of serious issues related to
mismanagement, fuel quality, and rampant corruption.70
In 2015, almost two years after the enormous corruption scandal took
place in the fuel contract of the MoD, the follow-up investigation disclosed
over $200 million fraud and misappropriation.71 According to SIGAR’s
Investigation Directorate, the four favorite winning contractors had
colluded with themselves and several top military personnel at the MoD,
contracting officials and financial advisors to jack up their bidding prices
above the competitive levels that existed in the MoI fuel contract.72
Ghazanfar Oil, Abdul Wase Faqiri, North One Logistics Services, and
General Logistics – the four winning contractors, Hazrat Omer Zakhailwal,
and Abdul Hadi Arghandiwal (top members of the Special Procurement
Commission of the MoD when signing the contract) had bribed their way
through the process.73
In 2016, President Ghani launched an investigation on the scandal.
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However, the investigative committee has not yet shared the result of the
investigation with the Afghan public.74 Humayon Humayon, head of the
Defense Committee in parliament said:
I have reviewed the fuel contracts of MoD, not only Afghan
Nationals but also international citizens are involved in the
corruption cases of the MoD fueling contracts. The contracts
were given to the former contract holders that means
corruption is huge within the contracts.75
This is not the only case of theft and corruption in fuel contracts of the
ANDSF. According to alleged report, on January 9, 2017, Major General
Abdul Wase Raoufi, received around “$150,000 bribe in exchange for
awarding one of that ministry’s fuel contract.”76 Due to the lack of
oversight over the influx of money from aid and military contracts with
insufficient control to prevent theft and fraud, both Afghan and
international actors drained resources from the reconstruction effort.77
Meanwhile, SIGAR’s investigations on fuel contracts of MoI and MoD
indicate that weaknesses and lack of monitoring from CSTC-A in
accounting for fuel provided to the ANDSF through both on-budget and
off-budget mechanisms have contributed to more corruption and theft in
procurement and contract processes.78
Therefore, SIGAR in its Second Learned Report articulates challenges in
reconstructing the ANDSF as such:
The ANDSF monitoring and evaluation tools relied heavily
on tangible outputs, such as staffing, equipping, and training
levels, as well as subjective evaluations of leadership. This
focus masked intangible factors, such as corruption, which
deeply affected security outcomes in classified U.S.
intelligence assessments.79
Moreover, a former senior U.S. official described the problem of
monitoring and oversight over foreign money influx for reconstruction
efforts in Afghanistan as below:
In a conflict environment, oversight is difficult, but our
systems of accountability are also poor. Therefore, when you
push large amounts of money through and there is no way to
pull it back, it creates an incentive for corruption. The
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environment in which you are operating shifts and corrupt
actors create ways to bleed the system for all it is worth,
because they know the money will keep flowing no matter
what they do, and they can make more by being corrupt than
non-corrupt. This is a dynamic we have to change if we want
to use our money well and effectively achieve our goals. The
U.S. officials on the ground have to be appropriately
authorized and encouraged to pull money back if it is not
being used well, and these decisions need to be politically
supported in Washington.80
In its part, along with the Afghan individuals, several foreign nationals
including their military officers and civilian contractors have massively
involved in corruption, fraud, kickbacks, and bribes during their mission
in Afghanistan. According to the U.S. Department of Justice, for example,
a former employee of a U.S. government contractor in Afghanistan named
Christopher McCray engaged with a case of corruption. An American
company that was moving cargo for the Army and the Air Force Exchange
Service from Bagram Airfield to Military bases through Afghanistan had
hired Mr. Christopher as the country manager. He had received illegal
kickbacks from an Afghan subcontractor in return to his assistance in
obtaining contracts from the U.S. government.81 McCray and the Afghan
subcontractor agreed to give him 15 percent of the revenues it would
receive on the contract. Thereafter, McCray was fabricating the invoices of
the contract continuously from 2012 to 2014.82 In another case, a former
U.S Army officer named Jimmy W. Dennis, who was working in the
Humanitarian Aid Yard at Bagram Air Field from March 2008 through
March 2009, with his friend's complicity, James C. Pittman in the same
company received $250,000 bribe from each Afghan vendor in return for
steering contracts to them. These two examples of the many in here are the
manifestation of serious financial mismanagement and fraud in foreign
aid to Afghanistan. As Dr. Karin von Hipple has cited in his article:
The international financial aid “has not gone directly to the
Afghan people. Rather, it has been channeled through layers
of contractors and implementing partners, each of which
takes a slice of the pie along the way. The international
contractors receive three-quarters of U.S. development
assistance in Afghanistan and nearly 60% of all international
assistance.”83
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Today, many experts in and out of Afghanistan believe that international
contractors with their Afghan partners are directly involved with
corruption scandals that have, too, given much room for resource draining
by the local stakeholders. Some observers put the blame, in particular, on
the United States for pursuing a wrong policy in fighting corruption in
Afghanistan. The observers contend that this could have been impossible
without the direct collusion of foreigners involved in the contracts. As one
researcher said:
The United States should first focus on its own ‘de facto’
corrupt foreign aid programs where contracts are given to a
narrow set of agencies and individuals and where actors in
the military-industrials foreign aid complex are recording
massive profits from the ongoing crisis and human tragedy
in Afghanistan. How can an entity, which has major
problems of corruption on its own, be able to solve
corruption in another country? The mere pumping of
massive amounts of money in obscure projects is bound to
promote corruption on either end (U.S. contractors and
Afghan implementers).84
Furthermore, some observers have cited that due to systemic corruption in
the security sector of Afghanistan, the ammunitions procured by the
Pentagon to the ANDSF have fallen into the Taliban hands.85 Also
according to The New York Times, arms and ordnance collected from dead
insurgents are identical to those of the ANDSF. Because of poor
governance and outright corruption within the ANDSF, the corrupt
network might have sold those military facilities to the Taliban and may
have helped the group stay supplied.86
Over the literature, there are serious concerns about the existence of
malign actors associated with the terrorist groups within the security
sector who do not only hand over the army facilities to the enemies but
also pave the ground for them to infiltrate the security systems. As a result,
they can carry out bloody assaults (known as an insider attack in Afghan
military parlance) on Afghan and international security forces. On April
22, 2017, several terrorist associates, dressed in Afghan military uniform,
driving military vehicles, made their way into the Afghan Military’s 209th
Corps compound in Mazar-e-Sharif and started opening fire which
claimed over 150 lives and many wounded.87 This attack, in particular, left
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serious questions unanswered: How could the enemy easily pass several
security gates and barriers without any challenge? In addition, did they
have any insider help? Additionally, as the result of the insider attack on
February 11, 2017, in Greshk, the district of Helmand province, one
security member who had joined the Afghan National Army before,
gunned down his security colleagues, which left sixteen-security forces
death, and the Taliban took responsibility for the attack.88 According to
the Christian Science Monitor, in March 2012, an Afghan policeman shot
down his colleagues in their sleep killing nine of them.89
Therefore, security sector corruption has, in particular, produced dire
consequences and undercut the readiness and effectiveness of both the
ANP and the ANA over the last several years.90 These three cases (insider
attacks) are among the many that the terrorist affiliates could carry out
through infiltrating the security system by disguising as security forces.
In August 2009, General McChrystal, the commander for the ISAF
(International Security Assistance Forces), expressed his concern about
the existence of corrupt networks inside the government who collude with
the terrorist in different circumstances. According to McChrystal: “There
are no clear lines separating insurgent groups, criminal networks, and the
GIROA officials. Malign actors within the Afghan government support
insurgent groups directly, support criminal networks that are linked to
insurgents, and support corruption that helps feed the insurgency.”91
Sarah Chayes, who had extensively been engaged in different processes of
building the ANDSF for the last several years, articulates her thoughts
about militaries when grappling with corruption as such:
The militaries in acutely corrupt countries are often poorly
trained, equipped, and their roster is full of ghost soldiers.
Officers sell materials even to the same enemies they are
supposed to be fighting. Military professionalism and
capabilities are inadequate to protect borders, leaving such
countries vulnerable to attack.92
Sarah further spells out how corruption what she calls was vertically
integrated in the government of Afghanistan during President Karzai. She
says, “Any move against any officials, no matter how lowly, would
reverberate all the way up to the chain to Karzai.”93 Nevertheless, the
United States and its allies have supported such corrupt government
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sitting in Kabul and equally share in outcomes, and should either admit
their faults or correct them.94
Figure 1. A Vicious Cycle of Corruption and Insecurity

Effects of Corruption

Insecurity

Poor/ Lack of
Development

Draining Resources

Weak Governance

Source: Author

Conclusion
Following the defeat of the Islamic Emirate, the United States-led
intervention had kicked off the process of state building in Afghanistan.
Among other things, conducting SSR, which entails the ANP and the ANA
both known as the ANDSF, was an integral part of these endeavors. In
doing so, the international community committed to donating a
tremendous amount of money. However, after more than one and a half
decades the Security Sector is grappling with several crosscutting issues
including, but not limited to, corruption, low capacities, lack of facilities,
and unnecessary casualties.
The incongruent policy between the United States and its European allies
wherein the former placed emphasis on militarized police, while the latter
developed the idea of civil police had further blurred the distinctive line
between the two different but interconnected security establishments. It is
found that this disparity jeopardized not only the potentials of police in
law enforcement including their anti-corruption efforts but also obstructed
the legitimacy of the government before the community in providing law
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and order in which the primary responsibility falls on police role. When
the United States put into forces its alternative on building police as the
first line of operation, one can argue that due to lack of advisors, technical
and logistic support, and inadequate resources, resulted in inauspicious
consequences for the Afghan police. Ultimately, neither could the police
build up their law enforcement capacity nor were they able to deal with the
insurgency.
The plan drafted by the international community in conducting SSR in
Afghanistan also suffered from several other fallacies. Their lack of
preparations and short-term policies for that ends along with privatization
of SSR did not produce desired outcomes on the ground. Privatization of
SSR, which might have resulted from lack of preparation, horribly affected
the operational capacity of the Afghan Security Forces. The two gigantic
United States private military corporations such as Blackwater and
DynCorp International, which were in charge of training, advising and
equipping the Afghan Security Forces for several years after the
engagement, had designed insufficient and ineffective training programs
that had negative implications on the operational capacities of the Afghan
Security Forces. This has ultimately undermined the counterinsurgency
campaign on the ground.
Conducting SSR is a long-term process, and it requires a long-term
mission and vision considering the size and scope of the forces necessary
in a certain post-conflict country. The absence of such a policy in
Afghanistan has marred the process of SSR in the country. Along with the
privatization of SSR as mentioned, the issue of constant turnover of the
international military advisors for training the ANDSF produced
unintended results. The constant transition of military advisors who were
shuttling between Kabul and Europe or Washington impeded the smooth
training processes over the past several years. In addition, it to put at risk
undertaking effective monitoring steps required for SSR that could help
come up with effective strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats
analysis. In contrast, the approach applied in building the Afghan security
forces impaired the training process and recognizing the possible threats
such as corruption.
Lack of transparency and oversight mechanism for monitoring the
implementation of projects, contracts, and procurement by the United
States and other international partners have given rise to an atmosphere
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conducive to the corruption that is omnipresent in the security sector. This
has led the foundation for a systemic corrupt bureaucracy in the security
sector in which different stakeholders and contractors embezzled a
tremendous amount money. The issue of badly- paid, under-resources,
ghost soldiers, corrupt systems of recruitment, and other malfeasances
have happened and continue to happen under the direct supervision of the
international community without taking effective and preventive
measures.
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